How do value chains evolve? How do sectors become dis-integrated? How and why do shifts back towards re-integration occur, abandoning old markets in favour of emerging new types of markets that serve 'one-stop-shop' needs? Surprisingly little research has been devoted to explaining how and why the institutional structure of an industry changes over time. While the literature looking at the individual make or buy choices of firms (e.g., Williamson 1985 Williamson , 1999 ) is quite extensive, only recently it has been acknowledged that the vertical structure of an industry, the "transactional menu of choices" from which firms choose is itself limited; evolves; and should be studied in its own right. For instance, we now know that the existence of choice as to whether a firm can make or buy --in other words, the existence of an intermediate market, should not be taken for granted. Thus, vertical dis-integration warrants individual study (see Jacobides 2005) . Similarly, and counter-intuitively, our analysis of a service industry suggests that even re-integration should not be taken for granted. The creation of new, all-inone solutions requires that final buyers change their purchasing behaviour, piecemeal procurement be abandoned, and new ways of pricing and trading re-integrated services be found, as producers cannot unilaterally re-integrate. So we need to look at how sectors', not just firms', scope evolves. Furthermore, to understand the vertical structure of a sector, we need to shift from a static analysis of the efficiency properties of vertical arrangements to the dynamic analysis of what causes the changes in the industry's scope. We must better understand the mechanisms underlying the evolution and change of "vertical architectures". To do so, we must move beyond the choices of individual firms and examine the dynamic relationship between firms and their institutional environment, studying the endogenous mechanisms of industry change.
Our paper contributes to this research programme by focusing on the process of vertical reintegration, considering it at the level of the of the whole value chain. By studying recent building procurement developments in the UK, we explain the emergence of 'integrated solutions' -a trend that is gaining currency in several industries (Davies 2003; 2004) . To do so, we show how the vertical division of labour determined and shaped the industry knowledge bases, and how the creation of a set of distinct knowledge bases led to particular trajectories of capability development. We consider why, over time, this set of path-dependent capabilities became inadequate to respond to customer needs, and why the vertical architecture of the industry became problematic -not because of the transactional risks entailed, but rather because of the set of system-wide capabilities that it led to. We inquire into what drove particular industry participants to change the vertical structure; trace their efforts to propose new, re-integrated solutions; and identify the factors that facilitated them in so doing.
This study elaborates Jacobides and Winter's (2005) recent analysis of how capabilities and scope co-evolve, and shows in particular how the vertical division of labour shapes a sector's knowledge bases, capability structures and improvement trajectories, dynamically determining the sector's efficiency. It also underscores the agency of firms in shaping and changing their industry environment, as opposed to merely reinforcing it (Whitley 1992; Callon 1998; Fligstein 2001; Djelic and Ainaimo 1999; Nooteboom 2001) .
THEORY: EXISTING VIEWS ON VERTICAL (RE-)INTEGRATION
The theoretical framework that focuses on the question of vertical scope in general, and on vertical integration in particular, is undoubtedly Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson 1975 (Williamson , 1985 (Williamson , 1999 Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978) . As Williamson noted, the 'main case' in TCE is the question of vertical integration, and a vast number of papers and books have been published on this subject since the 1980s (see Shelanski and Klein 1995; Boerner and Macher 2003) . TCE theorists argue that the greater the hazards related to market exchange, the more firms will shy away from it, since firms, comparatively speaking, are relatively safe. The transaction costs involved in using the market arise either from the ex ante problems of information misrepresentation for any given exchange (Barzel 1982) , or the risks of assetspecific investment (Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986) , the value of which may be expropriated ex post by an opportunistic party. Thus vertical integration sets in whenever a market transaction would require hard-to-get or hard-to-measure specific investment or effort.
In addition to the analysis of transactional factors, there is a long tradition of studies in the resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991) which, in building on Penrose (1959) , Richardson (1972) , business history (Chandler 1962 (Chandler , 1990 and innovation studies (Freeman and Soete 1997) , examine the role of competencies. While TCE and the resource based view were for a long time viewed as alternative explanations, more recently they have come to be considered as being complementary. For instance, even Williamson recommends that the traditional TCE query ''What is the best generic mode (market, hybrid, firm) to organise X' be replaced by the question 'How should firm A -which has pre-existing strengths and weaknesses (core competences and disabilities) -organise X? ' (1999: 1003) . In similar vein, Madhok (2002) points out that the cost characteristics of individual transactions can only be assessed in relation to the costs of internal production and these in turn depend on a firm's own capabilities, and the governance context it has created. 1 Both TCE and the capabilities-based studies that directly take on TCE-based explanations of vertical scope, consider the individual choices made by a firm that faces a clear menu of contractual alternatives. However, more recent research has investigated what lies behind and promotes this menu of alternatives. Jacobides (2005) , for instance, suggested that industries often start off being integrated: therefore, the interesting question is not 'will firm X integrate or not?', but rather 'does firm X have the opportunity of choosing whether it will be integrated or specialized?' This line of research has tried to determine what underlies the nature of the value chain. The focus has shifted from explaining the functional attributes of different institutional structures (the province of TCE), to explaining the process that underpins the changes in firms' and industries' boundaries, as well as what causes these evolutionary processes.
One of the interesting insights from the studies of vertical dis-integration, and in particular Baldwin and Clark's (2003) theoretical analysis and Jacobides's (2005) inductive study, is that new intermediate markets must converge in creating their own institutional and contractual infrastructure (North 1986) . The emergence of new markets at the level of the industry requires socio-cognitive and legitimizing structures (Porac et al. 1989) ; rests on social (White 1981 ) and institutional modes of interaction (Silver 1984; Langlois 1992) , which enable newly specialized buyers and sellers to interact through a market interface (Langlois and Robertson 1995) . New intermediate markets, in other words, must establish their own conventions and 'calculative devices' (Callon 1998).
What is even more interesting though, is that these factors are not relevant only in the case of dis-integration, but also apply to re-integration, especially in the services sector. This might at first sight seem counter-intuitive. Why would re-integration not arise from the unilateral decision of a producer? The answer is that if the world conformed to our simple canonical conceptions of vertical scope (where the production chain is seen as a linear set of valueadding steps, from raw materials to finished products, with the customer at its very end) then it would. Yet the reality is often different from this simplification (Porter, 1985) . In services, and in some manufacturing sectors as well, (re-)integrating means that the final buyer must abandon existing procurement from a host of specialized suppliers, and instead purchase a 'packaged solution' from an integrated player. Of course, this 'packaged solution' must itself be able to be sold, and the relevant institutional infrastructure must be developed. So, somewhat paradoxically, integrated solutions, and vertical re-integration often require the emergence of a new market, much as vertical dis-integration requires the emergence of a new intermediate market. Re-integration, then, might require an analysis that parallels that of dis-integraton, in terms of understanding its enabling processes and motivating factors. At the same time, we should expect substantial qualitative differences in the forces that 'break the system up' from those that 'lead to newly integrated bundles of services'. This leaves us with an interesting opportunity to develop theory, on the basis of a sector that has recently re-integrated.
In developing such a theory, we need to consider what drives the dynamics of the industrial system as it evolves. To do so, we draw substantially on Jacobides and Winter's (2005: 402) recent systemic analysis where they suggest that the cycle pushing toward specialisation gets reversed when new and superior capabilities arise from knowledge bases that are misaligned with the existing vertical structure of the industry. This sets in motion a process that may eventually make vertical integration typical … The ensuing selection process reduces overall specialisation, as integrated players out-compete the existing co-specialised ecosystem ... The shift of several manufacturing or component sectors towards "total solution provision" (Foote et al. 2001) , by redefining the scope and the way the firm and its identity (and capabilities) are defined, is a case in point.
In this paper, we empirically study the nature and role of knowledge bases; we look at how the vertical division of labour affects them; and we consider whether the analysis can shed light on vertical re-integration. We also consider Nooteboom's (2001) cycle of discovery, which posits that industries re-integrate so that new capabilities become seamlessly integrated into a coherent whole, and Fine's (1998) argument that industries re-integrate when some strong actors try to gain market power or impose proprietary technologies through re-integration.
Thus, our study is intended to complement the existing theory of vertical scope by looking at how knowledge bases and capabilities are shaped and dynamically constrained by the vertical organization of a sector. We consider what drives the process of vertical re-integration; study how firms' decisions about their scope interact with their institutional context; underscore the agency of firms in transforming their environment; and highlight how firms' competencies affect their 'institutional entrepreneurism'. Our level of analysis is set between the micro-mechanics of the individual transaction (Williamson 1985) , and the broader social forces that shape the national business system (Whitley 1992) , or conceptions of markets (Carruthers and Babb 2000; Fligstein 2001 ). We focus on key meso-level phenomena at the level of an industry and value chain structure, and of the participants within it. We consider how value chain structures affects participants, and how participants, in turn, re-shape the value chain structure.
In building an inductive theory, we draw on institutional and evolutionary economics or the studies of industry change, and also on other strands of research that do not focus on vertical scope itself, and as such are mentioned in the discussion rather than the theory overview section. Specifically, we draw on institutional sociology, and in particular the analysis of social fields (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996) ; classic works on competence (Penrose, 1959) ; and research that links firms' actions to their institutional environment (Nooteboom, 2001; Djelic and Ainamo, 1998) to the extent that they help us understand the nature and causes of vertical re-integration.
METHODS AND DATA
We adopted the methodological stance of using existing theories in "appreciative mode" (Nelson and Winter 1982) . That is, while we started with a loose set of ideas and frameworks drawn from existing theory, our focus was the development of new insights or constructs through numerous iterations between theory and evidence (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1989) . In this iterative process we used multiple sets of data (archival, quantitative / descriptive statistics, and qualitative), and were careful to ensure triangulation between these different data sources.
Some background on the broader research project may be useful to explain some of our data (and especially interview) choices, and the sequencing of data collection. This paper grew out of a research project aimed at understanding the processes of competence accumulation and adaptation in firms operating through projects, which initially focused on an in-depth case study of a large, integrated British engineering consultancy. In the course of the case study, it became clear that the dynamics of organizational change inside the company, and in particular the motivations and outlook of the actors involved, were linked to the changing institutional landscape of the British construction industry, and therefore we looked carefully at these broader dynamics. A large part of the documentary evidence reported here was primarily gathered to gain an understanding of, and document the wider trends in, the context in which the case study firm operated.
As evidence was being accumulated, we realized that a the context itself would be a very interesting area of study. We thus expanded the data, modified the scope, and extensively used complementary sources on the evolution of this industry. The initial set of hypotheses on the nature of the evolution of supply chain relationships was developed on the basis of the evidence gleaned from 60 semi-structured interviews with industry participants, largely associated with the original case study. In this paper, we draw on these interviews only in a limited way, as they relate mostly to specific processes in the case study firms. We rely heavily on the documentary part of our data collection, which was initially undertaken in order to triangulate the data from within the company, with external data.
Specifically, the archival data we used came from a thorough analysis of the trade press from the beginning of the 1990s --in particular, Building, the most widely circulated industry publication; the New Civil Engineer, the magazine of the Institution of Civil Engineers; and Construction News. We also read relevant reports produced by professional bodies, and government sponsored studies, primarily the Latham and Egan reports (Latham 1994; Construction Task Force 1998) . Evidence from these sources was then compared and contrasted with the accounts provided by various interviewees, from different professions, from the case-study firm.
Once the decision was made to conduct a broader analysis of the shifts in the industry's environment, we expanded and deepened our sources. We made a systematic overview of the data on the range of services provided by various industry participants (and their corresponding patterns of employment of professionals), by looking at the annual surveys carried out by Building and the New Civil Engineer. These sources of data proved invaluable in confirming the qualitative and interview / archival evidence on changes in the sector's professional structure, and the services / competencies of different types of firms. We compared the changing patterns of employment of chartered professionals from 1989 onwards using the annual Building surveys. The New Civil Engineer survey data helped us to gauge the growing spectrum of activities carried out by engineering firms; they also allowed us to engage in a count of the 'fields' used to classify their activities over the years (again from 1989). This gave us some more objective measures in terms of both scope, and self-professed activities or capabilities, which are partly reported in the tables.
We also conducted further primary research aimed at clarifying the role and strategies of contractors through a second examination of the trade press journals, and scrutiny of the annual reports and websites of the major contractors. We searched for specialized industry reports and by this means were able to confirm, for instance, that our findings were consistent with two studies by Hillebrandt (1990 Hillebrandt ( , 1995 about the recent evolution of British contracting firms. Another important source of material were the Construction Industry Council and the Department of Trade and Industry's (CIC and DTI 2003) surveys of professional service firms. These surveys provide data that further support the picture of the evolution of the industry gained from examination of largely qualitative material, and there were no substantial discrepancies between our account, and these industry-level reports and statistics. Finally, we drew on some of the seminal academic research on the evolution of the sector (Winch 2000a; Gann 2000; Grout 1997; Hoxley 2000) which was found also to be broadly consistent with our analysis.
Thus, our study relies heavily on archival material and some descriptive statistics on the industry; on descriptions of the sector's evolution; on government and academic reports; and on our own primary data collection in the field, through interviews and company information. More importantly, the results reported here triangulate a wide array of different sources, each of which is addressed to and covers a different set of contingencies. That is, our data do not represent a view of the industry's evolution from only one part of the industry; rather, we have considered the entire set of actors that drove re-integration. Also, we have been careful to ensure triangulation between the different sorts and sources of data. While we were not faced with any major inconsistencies between these sources (which increases our confidence in what we report), our strategy was to seek out additional information such that any discrepancy could be reconciled. We employed additional qualitative sources to provide further guidance or resolution to any puzzle in the data, until any discrepancies were accounted for.
3 PROCURING BUILDINGS: VALUE CHAIN STRUCTURE AND PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED 3.1.
The Setting: A Challenging set of Tasks to Organize
The process of designing and constructing a building involves a multitude of organizations, whose activities are coordinated in the 'building procurement system'. The building procurement system itself involves significant transactional issues (Winch 2001) . Buildings are expensive, customized goods with a comparatively long life span, and typically are purchased before the client can fully assess their features. In addition, buildings are complex goods, comprising a large number of systems and subsystems, including a high (and increasing) proportion of mechanical and electrical systems such as air conditioning, elevators and fire management (Gann, 2000) .
The difficulties in accurately assessing the quality of a building and its technical complexity create significant moral hazards and adverse selection risks. The client is particularly vulnerable to these risks during the construction phase, since once the work has begun it is very costly, if not impossible, to change contractors (Winch 2001) . A further complication is that over time, as the client gets a better feel for what is wanted, or as plans are adapted, changes and modifications become necessary. In addition to these purely transactional complications, there is the challenge of organizing the production, and accumulating and refining the appropriate skills: for the building to be completed, a wide set of fairly disparate competencies and attributes must be brought together and integrated into the final solution (the building that is sold) -ranging from the artistic conception of the design, to the engineering soundness, to the cost-and time-effectiveness of the building.
3.2.
The 'Building System': A Path-dependent, Nation-Specific Way to Organize
Given these substantial challenges, the structure of the industry in terms of the division of tasks and responsibilities becomes critical. In general, the organization of competencies in the different types of organizations involved in producing a building varies substantially by country (see Winch 2000b). As for the resulting transactional problems vis-à-vis the final buyer of a building, they are solved partly through the use of contractual strategies (for instance, the separation of design from construction) and partly through 'trilateral governance' (Williamson 1985) , i.e. the introduction of 'control actors' (Winch and Campagnac 1995) that verify the performance of the contractors and facilitate the process of negotiating change and solving disputes that derive from changing client requirements. Such 'control actors' are particularly useful when clients are inexperienced and when buildings are complex, since an inexperienced client finds it difficult to assess the quality of the contractor's work, and the complexity involved in the expected use of the building makes it difficult (or perhaps even infeasible) for clients to specify ex ante exactly all the properties required of the building. The combination of these actors, and the attendant institutional infrastructure is what the industry literature often refers to as the 'building system' (Bowley 1966; Winch 2002) .
The basic characteristics of a building procurement system can be identified by the way in which the activities connected with conception (i.e., design), construction and control are organized (Winch and Campagnac 1995) . Comparative international analysis underscores the path-dependency of the building system. Building procurement presents a tension between a 'professional model'-based on a specialized division of labour in which design is separated from construction-and an 'industrial model' in which design and construction are integrated (Campagnac 2000) . However, the specific ways in which this tension surfaces, and in particular the level and type of specialization and integration, differ substantially across countries. In the words of Campagnac (2000: 139) comparative European research […] shows how the opposition between these two models [i.e. the 'professional' and the 'industrial'] is found in all the countries observed, even if it crystallises more around the domination of one or the other according to the country. The outcome is a function of the particular historical configurations within the national contracting system and the compromise reached between the actors over time during the course of their relationships and conflicts, but also as a function of the legal mode of regulation and the social relationships at the national and sectoral levels.
This substantial international difference in neighbouring countries, which has also contributed to limiting globalization in the construction industry, serves as a potent reminder that there are multiple ways in which a business system can be organized, not just at the national level (e.g. Whitley 1992 Whitley , 1998 ), but also at the level of the industry. That is, there are many different ways of dividing labour between industry participants.
We now turn to a brief description of the 'before' and 'after' state of the industry to enable an examination of its evolution.
The Base-line: 'Traditional' Building Procurement Structures in the UK
Our description starts with what is currently known as 'traditional procurement' in the UKwhich is a variation of the professional model of building procurement, and represents the 'disintegrated' mode of organization which predominated from the late 1800s until the late 1970s.
Within this mode, a client procuring a building appoints an architect who acts as the main client adviser. 2 The architect advises the client on the selection of other consultants, in particular the various specialist engineers and the quantity surveyor. Once the design is complete, the quantity surveyor measures it, producing a Bill of Quantities, which lists the amounts of materials required to carry out the construction, and estimates the costs. The architect's drawings and the Bill of Quantities become the basis for the competitive tendering process through which the client, with the advice of the architect and the quantity surveyor, selects the main contractor who will carry out the physical construction of the building. Once appointed, the main contractor subcontracts some of the work to other firms, again often through a competitive process, although the designers can nominate key subcontractors. Crucially, in this configuration, illustrated in Figure 1 , the client has individual contracts with all the players, except the subcontractors. Traditional procurement is therefore characterized by the separation of conception from construction, and by two control roles, one concerned with quality (the architect) and the other with costs (the quantity surveyor), this latter being characteristic of British procurement (Winch 2001).
Insert Figure 1 about here

Proliferation of Contractual Structures and Re-integration: New Modes Emerge
This traditional mode of organization was more or less dominant until the late 1980s when several new, more integrated alternatives began to emerge, and offered alternative ways of organizing the industry. Gann (2000) , in a review of the sector, suggests that dozens of variations have become accepted and used in the sector.
These new contractual / organizational structures usually fell into two broad categories: management for a fee, and Design and Build (D&B). 3 In the first type, project management services are provided for a fee as an extension of the services offered by either consultants (construction management) or contractors (management contracting). In management for a fee structures, the client still has separate contracts with a number of actors and, in the case of the construction management approach, the number of the client's contractual relationships is even greater as in this case the subcontractors also have a contracts directly with the client. In other words, management for a fee approaches are essentially a variation of traditional procurement, in which the coordinating role of architects has been carved out and taken over by another actor, who partly integrates into the architect's role.
In D&B procurement, in contrast, the client appoints a single contractor (rather than a designer), who assumes overall responsibility for the project, including design (see Figure 2) . In this configuration, designers are contractually linked to the contractor rather than the client, thereby reducing the number of contractual relationships the client needs to manage. Therefore, the D&B route provides full contractual integration of design and construction. While contractors still rely to some extent on external designers, most large firms have chosen to integrate into design, bringing in a broader set of competencies and expertise, as will be described in a subsequent section.
What is interesting is not just the emergence of these new, more integrated arrangements in the sector, but also the fact that they became empirically prevalent. As can be seen from Figure 3 , alternative procurement routes, and D&B in particular, have proliferated and account for a significant proportion of the British market, moving building procurement towards the industrial integrated model. We next consider how and why these new structures came about. We start with the emergence of the 'traditional', specialized mode of production and consider why it was dominant for such a long time; we then move gradually to the explanation of why reintegration, under many different guises, became established and took over in this sector.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here
HOW AND WHY THE SECTOR SHIFTED FROM DIS-INTEGRATION TO RE-INTEGRATION
Specialization Setting In and Taking Hold: Late 19 th century to 1970s
The basic features of British traditional procurement had stabilized at the end of 1800s (Ball 1988; Bowley 1966) . The separation of design from construction, the selection of the main contractor on the basis of competitive tendering, and the role of professionals as controllers of the work of the contractors were particularly suited to the needs of relatively inexperienced clients (especially those clients involved in the construction boom of the industrial revolution) and to need for accountability in public procurement, which became increasingly important during the 20 th century.
The stabilization of traditional procurement at the end of the 1800s was accompanied by the professionalization of the occupations at the conception end and at the procurement process: architects, engineers and quantity surveyors (Ball 1988; Bowley 1966) . Such professionalization played a central role in making the structure of traditional procurement sustainable, as the disciplinary activity carried out by professional bodies contributed to reassure clients of the integrity of professionals acting on their behalf as controllers of contractors (Ball 1988; Saint 1983; Thompson 1968) . Professionalization and the resultant trust that was established, was what enabled transactions characterized by high uncertainty and low frequency, such as those involved in procuring a building, to be carried out through a market interface (Winch 2001).
In order to make the claims of professionals of acting in the interests of the client more credible, the professional bodies of architects and quantity surveyors (but not engineers) applied rigid employment restrictions to their members. In 1887, chartered architects were excluded from working for limited liability companies or from becoming directors of companies connected with construction, property or development. From 1907, professional quantity surveyors belonging to the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors were not allowed to work for limited liability companies in the construction field. Quantity surveyors working for contractors were organized in a parallel body, the Institute of Quantity Surveyors, which regulated them. Employment restrictions, coupled with rigid phasing of the project, promoted separate, specialised vertical silos. The non-professionalization of contractors, and the employment restrictions on architects, drastically limited the availability of architectural expertise in contracting firms (Hillebrandt 1984) . Over time, rules, regulations and training structures (see for instance Crinson and Lubbock (1994) on architectural education) supporting this specialized division of labour ensued, and reinforced this structure. 
The Wind of Change: Decline in Demand, Systemic Failures becoming Evident
While this system remained virtually unchanged for close to a century, problems eventually surfaced. In the 1970s, the sudden halt in the post World War II construction boom precipitated a crisis in traditional procurement, and in the organization of the industry that had formed around it, in particular its specialized division of labour. A number of issues were responsible. First, the system as a whole was becoming increasingly incapable of coping with what was being demanded. The rigid separation of design from construction, both contractually and in terms of a rigid phasing of the project, interfered with technological and managerial continuity, making it impossible for any single actor to have control. As J. Nisbet, former President of the Quantity Surveying Division of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, remarked:
Architects are expected to produce working drawings and the builder is expected to carry out works in accordance with such drawings. The structural engineer relies upon the manufacturers to design the connections for a steel frame. The services engineer expects a subcontractor, appointed after the builder, to prepare all installation (i.e. working) drawings. Design co-ordination before construction starts is therefore impossible and ad hoc alterations on site are inevitable. Further, the tender and contract procedures adopted by architects and service engineers are at variance one with the other, and this leads to difficulties and animosity in the management of cost and the administration of the contract conditions. Architects' designs are usually the subject of Bills of Quantities but services engineers resolutely require tenders to be based on drawings and specifications. The common range of conditions of contract place responsibility of the cost of a project solely upon one person, usually an architect or engineer. The procedures adopted by the services engineer effectively prevent the architect or engineer from exercising control over the cost of the services element of a project. Urgent attention should therefore be given to the elimination of this muddle.
(quoted in Latham, 1994: 24) .
These characteristics meant that not only were the cost and time of completion unpredictable, but also that the client had difficulties in holding any of the actors involved responsible for delays or cost overruns (Morris 1994).
Second, during the 1970s the characteristics of demand changed significantly, making these shortcomings even more important. The state as a client began to lose its importance compared with private sector clients: from accounting for about 50% of all new construction work in the mid 1950s it reached a nadir in the second half of the 1980s, when it accounted for only about 20% (DETR; DTI). During the second half of the 1980s up to 1990, the construction sector experienced rapid growth mainly as a result of work for private commercial clients, which increased 100% over that period (DETR; DTI). This, in conjunction with declining orders from the public sector, made commercial clients a greater force in the industry (Latham 1994; Gann 2000) . Private commercial clients were experienced buyers and therefore were less dependent on a professional designer overseeing contractors. The dominance of such clients reinforced the emphasis on time and cost management already brought to the forefront by the economic crisis of the 1970s, as opposed to the aesthetic aspects of buildings and accountability, which had been important in the past (Morris 1994; Latham 1994; Ball 1988; Gann 2000) .
The search for ways to overcome the limitations of traditional procurement with regard to time and cost control led clients, and in particular private commercial ones, to search for an actor who could be the 'single point of responsibility' and ensure a better integration among the phases of the construction process (Latham 1994) . This trend towards re-integration, spearheaded by private commercial clients, was precipitated by the state through a wide range of initiatives. These included two major government reports in 1994 and 1998 which became known as the Latham and Egan Reports (Latham 1994 ; Construction Task Force 1998), which were followed by programmes to enable the implementation of their recommendations. Alternative routes were widely adopted in government procurement and a new form of public procurement, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), was launched in 1992. The PFI was the most contractually integrated form of procurement, as it entailed awarding a single contract covering the whole life cycle of a facility from financing through to maintenance and disposal.
Agents of Change: Contractors, Engineering Consultants, Quantity Surveyors
Yet although both the government and private clients were encouraging re-integration, it was the industry participants themselves that brought it about. In response to the increasingly obvious and consequential limitations of specialization, the productive system in buildings reintegrated in two fairly distinct ways. The first was via contractual reintegration, with the diffusion of procurement routes such as D&B and PFI, which reduced the number of contractual relationships that the client needed to manage. The actors (in particular, contractors) started spanning greater parts of the production process. In the case of PFI in particular, consortia, which typically are led by contractors (Ridout 1994), essentially constituted the thin layer that was responsible for coordinating other agents, and therefore (from the buyers' perspective) the system became more integrated. However, these consortia were reliant on their constituent companies for the actual carrying out of the project and on a range of specialized players.
However, there was some real integration going on as well. The larger firms in all the groups of players were offering more integrated services and also were more integrated in terms of production. The largest contractors integrated into project financing, and into design and facilities management, which often accounted for 40% or more of their turnover at the beginning of 2000 (examples include AMEC, Carillion, Mowlem, Kier and Balfour Beatty). Similarly, the profile of professional services firms changed significantly between (CIC & DTI 2003 . During this period, the fees generated by firms in which no single professional service accounted for more than 50% of fees ('no dominant service' firms) rose from 5% to 18% of the market.
Yet, although it is clear that re-integration was pushed by a number of industry participants, this fact does not provide the answer to the question of why re-integration was pursued. Nor does it explain why it was preceded by such a long period of specialization. The next section presents our inductive framework which explores these dynamics; drawing on the data, it articulates a theoretical framework which helps to explain the dynamics of the industry and value chain evolution. First, however, it is important to point out that, in keeping with studies of institutional change (see Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996) , the change in the building system was facilitated or precipitated by environmental shocks.
The first such shock, or enabler, was not entirely related to the construction industry-it consisted of the political desire to eliminate professional privileges and regulations by the late 1980s (Burrage 1992) , which further facilitated the vertical re-organization of the sector. The ban on employment of chartered architects by contracting organizations and limited liability companies was lifted at the end of the 1980s, mandatory fee scales were abolished and compulsory competitive tendering, rather than negotiation, for the procurement of professional services was introduced in the public sector soon after. Competitive tendering for professional services soon became widespread in the private sector also (Latham 1994; Hoxley 2000) .
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These changes broke the institutional barriers between different phases of the procurement process by breaking the monopoly of the professions over direct relationships with the client and over specific parts of the procurement process while commodifying traditional professional services.
The second shock was the economic recession of the late 1970s, which meant that many of the participants in the sector were, in relative terms, weak, and as such, not able to protect their own turf. This, in tandem with the privatization of the state's design offices and property management agencies, and the ensuing competition, led to a sense of crisis, where structural changes appeared more plausible, and where firms were increasingly tempted to invade each others' domains to survive, as is obvious from the industry press (Davis 1994b; 1994c; 1994a; Fishlock 1994; Ridout 1994; Hoare 1994 ) and ethnographic accounts (Becher 1999) .
KNOWLEDGE BASES, CAPABILITY TRAJECTORIES AND THE LIMITS OF SPECIALIZATION
In this section, we articulate our framework which explains when and why industries reintegrate, and provide the empirical evidence to support it. First, we consider how the increasingly stable, vertically specialized structure of the value chain leads to a specific set of knowledge bases, which, in turn, determine the trajectories of capability development. Next, we consider how, over time, the existence of these very trajectories may challenge the structure of the system. And third, we consider how and why existing players take the initiative to re-organize the industry, gradually leading to new re-integrated solutions.
Specialization: Self-perpetuation and Shaping the Sectors' Knowledge Bases
The first part of our framework posits that the vertical division of labour creates a set of increasingly distinct knowledge bases; we also argue that these knowledge bases shape and, crucially, constrain the trajectories of capability development.
In our setting, the division between architects, builders, contractors and quantity surveyors led to the creation of highly differentiated actors. As a study on the industry's evolution put it,
The builder had a poor public image and, in general, until shortly after the Second World War, most directors of building companies had worked their way up from the crafts. The only obvious source of well-educated persons for building contracting -the architects and the quantity surveyors -were not permitted to participate in commercial activities and, very often, after building increased in complexity and size in the post-war period, the man in charge of a building firm or the building part of a large contracting firm was a civil engineer by training. (Hillebrandt, 1984, p. 154) .
So the division of labour, amplified by a hierarchy of professions (Abbott, 1988) in which a hierarchical division of labour was mirrored in a hierarchical social structure (Bowley, 1966) , set the different participants apart (Moore and Dainty 2001).
The role of architects is a case in point. The employment restrictions on architects as professionals, devised to be a hallmark and guarantee of their independence, pushed architecture towards its artistic end and limited architects' understanding of the construction process and of on-site operations. This lack of appreciation of other parts of the system was further aggravated in the 1960s by the dominance of the artistic dimension of Modernism on the syllabuses of architecture students, steering architectural training even deeper into the realm of art at the expense of technology and management (Crinson and Lubbock 1994) . Similarly, quantity surveying, which has always been the occupation that encountered the most difficulties in sustaining is claim to be a profession (Male 1990) , was steered along a narrowing path of competencies in accountancy and procurement, and is even in these days perceived to be characterised by 'tunnel vision' (Davis Langdon & Everest Consultancy Group 1991) , with a very limited understanding of design issues (Rouse 2000).
So not only did these professionals have a very distinct set of competencies, but this set of competencies determined the way in which their capabilities would develop over time. Much as in the study of technology, trajectories affect how knowledge accumulates (cf. Dosi 1982), in an industry, the vertical division of labour created 'trajectories' which define and prescribe the way in which knowledge and competency development will develop over time. Table 1 summarizes our findings on these different knowledge bases and capability improvement trajectories of the principal industry participants. It identifies the different roles of the participants in the industry (which derive from their prescribed scope), and provides information on their corresponding competencies; which, in turn, define the bounds of their capability development process. In other words, Table 1 gives an illustration how the vertical division of labour shapes the knowledge bases and the resulting trajectories of capability development. This explains how the 'vertical architecture' of a sector can dynamically shape its future capabilities and system-wide efficiencies.
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Limits Imposed by a Specialized Division of Labour: Slipping through the Cracks.
The next part of our inductive framework suggests that the aggregate performance of the sector may or may not be tenable, depending on whether the trajectory of capability development is able to meet the demands placed upon it. If capability development in a vertically specialized way leaves some important elements of the system unattended, that is, allows them to 'slip through the cracks', then pressures for re-integration may emerge. These pressures will be even greater if demand changes, or if the existing institutionalized division of labour is challenged by exogenous shocks, which seems to have been the case in our setting.
In the traditional organization of the industry there was no role for, or structures permitting any single actor to develop competencies across the various aspects of building, and especially not across design, cost and construction. Architects knew about design, but not about construction, or cost and time management, often pointed to in the literature on 'buildability' (e.g., CIRIA (1983) and by architects themselves (e.g., RIBA (1992); Allinson (1993) as severe limitations. Contractors had expertise in construction, and management and cost control, but were institutionally banned from feeding this into design, and from developing any competence in design. Consequently, one of the major sources of delays and cost overruns in construction derives from lack of 'buildability', and more generally from the lack of opportunities for construction expertise to influence design (Bowley 1966; Morris 1994) . The vertical division of labour, through its shaping of the knowledge bases and capability development processes in the industry, had reached its limits and emerging demands could not be satisfied by this disintegrated structure (cf. Jacobides and Winter 2005) . Satisfying the growing interest of clients in a single point of responsibility that could effectively integrate the process, required a change in the institutional structure of the industry.
These features were becoming increasingly crucial and relevant to the industry, as the qualitative nature of demand was changing. Private commercial clients from the second half of the 1980s used their increasing influence to enforce major changes in the industry in order to reduce the time and costs of construction and increase predictability. The Egan report (Construction Task Force 1998) reports for instance that Tesco (a major supermarket chain) was able to reduce its building costs by about 40% in five years, and the Whitbread Hotel Company was able to reduce construction times by 40% in three years. More to the point, they achieved this by instigating changes to how buildings were procured.
The limitations of specialization were not only recognized by those procuring buildings, but also by the industry participants. So, facilitated by the removal of regulatory barriers and the weakened influence of the professions, and the opportunities offered from a sector in decline, re-integration set in. Several firms integrated missing competencies within their boundaries so as to ostensibly appear able to provide a more extensive set of services. 6 The 1980s and more especially the 1990s were a period of mergers and acquisitions, as a result of which previously vertically specialized firms brought in-house, activities that hitherto had been carried out by other actors (Construction News 2000; Bolton 2001; Ridout 1994; Hoare 1994; Fishlock 1994 ). Consequently, most major firms in the industry today emphasize their ability to provide clients with an integrated package of services, and are characterized by their ability to provide a wide range of services. How they achieved this position is interesting.
Agency, Strategizing and the Push for Vertical Re-integration
The last part of our inductive framework concerns the firms promoting re-integration, and delves more deeply into the nature of agency in re-shaping industry structure. Our argument is that once the dis-integrated system starts to become inadequate to meet the demands placed upon it (as a result of the relative demand and capability development trajectories), firms respond by trying to provide new services. However, each firm will advocate a particular type of re-integration, which preserves or defends its original competencies and advantages. We can see that, especially when threatened by the spectre of commoditization, or intensifying competition, firms will aggressively pursue strategies of re-integration to protect their profitability or ratchet up, or up-sell their advantage. So re-integration is driven by the strategic efforts of firms to ensure their success, often under adverse conditions.
To provide the relevant evidence for this last part of our framework, we consider how three different types of industry participants (engineering consultants, contractors and quantity surveyors) each approached re-integration; the evidence is summarized in Table 2 .
Include Table 2 about here
Contractors
The lack of a contracting profession, the limited design expertise available to contractors, and inability to influence design decisions, all contributed to making contractors focus almost exclusively on ways to improve the management of the construction process. Furthermore, competition based on price coupled with the inability to influence design and severe cost checks by quantity surveyors made contractors extremely conscious of the cost dimension, which provoked much complaint from architects working for contractors in D&B projects (Akintoye and Fitzgerald 1995) .
Project management and cost control skills became increasingly important during the 1970s, when general contractors increased their reliance on subcontracting, in a bid to improve flexibility as they confronted higher workload uncertainty (recovery periods after the 1970s were usually 'bumpy') and cope with the already mentioned increasing technical complexity of building, which demanded further specialization (Hillebrandt 1995; Gann 2000) . Over the 1980s, the main activities of general contractors become project management of the construction phase, with most of the actual construction work being carried out by subcontractors and often by a casual workforce (Hillebrandt and Canon 1990) . Contractors saw in the client demand for a single point responsibility able to exercise authoritative control over costs and time, the opportunity to use their project management skills to escape from their relegated role and the low margins of traditional contracting. Contractors actively and successfully proposed themselves as project managers on the basis of the experience they had gained in the traditional procurement environment, causing much concern to the traditional professions (RIBA 1992; Davis Langdon & Everest Consultancy Group 1991) . Similarly, they saw the market for facilities management as extending over time their role of coordinators and controllers of subcontractor's work.
The big multi-disciplinary construction companies see FM as a way of extending their management role. They have a history of overseeing subcontracted work.
[…] Gerry Barron-Fox, marketing director of Tarmac FM, sees his business as no different from managing any sizable civils project: "We are going into a market that is allied to the type of construction experience Tarmac has -selling high margin management expertise. Professional services will eventually create the same turnover for us as road building." (Hoare 1994, p.16) 
Engineering consulting firms
Among the actors in the construction industry, engineers are those that have experienced the least restrictions on employment opportunities. Professional engineers were able to become consultants or work in any other capacity in the contracting industry. As Hillebrandt put it, Although individuals tend to have preference for one or the other at a fairly early stage, many have some experience of both worlds and, in any case, they speak the same language, whether on the design side or on the contracting side. This has undoubtedly done much to facilitate good relations and a smooth process of construction in civil engineering as compared to building, where architects and quantity surveyors often do not really understand the mentality of the contractors with whom they are dealing -or indeed each other (Hillebrandt 1984, p. 153) .
Furthermore, in a civil engineering project, a civil engineer would be leading both the contractor and the design team, and in the latter filling the quantity surveying role. If a project manager was needed, he would be a civil engineer and the client would also probably be represented by a civil engineer (Hillebrandt, 1984) . Project management was already well within the realm of engineering consultancies and this was perceived as a strength. As in the director of a leading integrated engineering consultancy remarked (Cacciatori 2003) :
You see, if I have to think of a strength of our company, we have always being good at managing large, technically complex projects.
When confronted with the difficult years at the beginning of the 1990s, therefore, engineers could present themselves as project managers able to deal with both design and construction issues. Also, engineering consulting firms traditionally were the largest of the professional services firms and, arguably, the more internally diverse because of the proliferation of engineering disciplines that have characterized the profession since its inception (Buchanan 1989; Clarke and Herrmann, 2001 ).
In the 1990s, multidisciplinary engineering design firms, which had already acquired architectural practices and had well developed project management skills, expanded to include management activities, cost consultancy (typically a quantity surveying activity), and facilities management. The increase in the number of fields used by the New Civil Engineer survey to classify the areas of activity of each company, which rose from 25 in 1989 (the first year in which the classification is available) to 53 in 2001, testifies to this process. It is notable that the 2001 survey includes, for the first time, fields such as construction methodology (although construction management had been included since 1989), project management, risk management, quantity surveying, facilities management, law contracts and arbitration, management consultancy and economics and development planning, with the top ten companies operating in all of these fields. The provision of integrated services was seen as a step beyond project management and multidisciplinary engineering in moving away from largely commodified technical services and from "being identified as a cost" to being "considered a strategic value" (Rubin and Powers, 2001: 51) . Figure 4 documents this trend; it shows the evolution of the self-definition provided in the annual New Civil Engineer survey of the top ten UK consultancies ranked by fees. Enlargement of the scope of activities of these companies tends to be reported by simply adding the new activities to the list.
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Quantity surveying firms
Quantity surveyors have seen their way forward in the enlargement and adaptation of their knowledge in procurement and cost management:
The provision of independent procurement advice together with the co-ordination and management of the process is a highly valued service, much in demand. Quantity Surveyors strong presence here has its origin in quantification: part of the rationale for Bills of Quantities is to procure competitively priced construction work. However, Quantity Surveyors have expanded services from the largely technical function of measurement through organising the tendering process and consultancy on the appropriate procurement methods and the management of the process (Davis Langdon and Everest Consultancy Group 1991:22] .
Thus, quantity surveyors have built on their competencies as the cost controllers of contractors to expand their activities into broad cost and procurement advice, and particularly project management. Their solution to providing a one-stop shop revolves around cost consultancy either at the initial stages of the project when the client is evaluating procurement solutions, or at a later stage when the client needs to check on those providing the construction itself or needs advice about how to best manage the property (in terms, for instance, of renting or maintenance strategies). This role of cost consultant is often combined with provision of project management services and with management consultancy focused on the strategic use of property (University of Reading and DTZ Debenham Thorpe 1995; Davis Langdon and Everest Consultancy Group 1991; Cranfield University School of Management 2002) . As a quantity surveyor in a large surveying firm, remarked when the recession of the early 1990s was coming to an end:
We are now being brought in earlier on projects and appointed direct instead of being commissioned by an architect. This means that areas apart from construction are now discussed. (quoted in Davis (1994b:6)) Interestingly, while large 'multidisciplinary' engineering consultancies have integrated into quantity surveying in order to provide one-stop-shop consultancies, quantity-surveying dominated firms have not integrated into design, either architectural or engineering (their share of the design services market is zero (CIC and DTI 2003) ). Furthermore, only 40% of the multidisciplinary firms that originally provided surveying services also provide engineering services, while 70% provide management and legal services (CIC and DTI 2003) . Integration for quantity surveyors has therefore been driven by an effort to build on their existing competencies and to preserve their traditional role of cost controller. In sum, they have built and integrated a solution that complements the integrated contractors and provides a transactional "control" in terms of trilateral governance (Winch, 2001).
Summary: How and Why Re-Integration Sets in
To summarize, therefore, we have argued that, in an industry, the vertical division of labour in general and dis-integration in particular, tends to create self-sustaining dynamics, which also encompass broader social structures such as professions, regulators, professional education, etc., which operate largely at the level of a country -hence the country-specific path dependency in the division of labour. That division of labour also 'chops up' the value chain into particular parts -and, probably, a hierarchy of different segments. This compartmentalization then affects the knowledge base for each segment, which in turn sets the trajectory for capability development. This trajectory, in its turn, affects the evolution of the system overall. It may even be, as is likely the case in construction, that this trajectory led to a relative worsening in some attributes, such as buildability -since architects became increasingly separated and specialized, and as such unconnected to the other parts of the building process. This trajectory dynamically determines the capabilities in a sector; and if these capabilities are not good enough to cope with existing, and even more so with emerging demand, and some key requirements 'fall through the cracks', re-integration must ensue. Exogenous shifts (such as the de-institutionalization of professions and regulatory fluidity, or the increased importance of new demand attributes) may facilitate or speed up this progress. Figure 5 , which summarizes our framework, schematically illustrates this point.
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Insert Figure 5 about here 7 Note that the three "columns" of Figure 5 , which summarizes our inductive theoretical framework, correspond to the analysis in sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 respectively, seen from left to right: The first "column" considers how the vertical division of labour shapes capabilities and their trajectory; the second considers how gaps between demand and supply trajectories emerge; and the third column considers how and why reintegration emerges, going from the macro-issues (at the top) to the micro (at the bottom), thus highlighting the interaction between agency, structure, and opportunity.
Once the need for re-organization becomes obvious, a 'latent' and fairly strategically minded army of institutional innovators, starts offering new solutions, which, coincidentally, seem to mirror the proposing organizations' competencies and advantages. Table 2 summarizes the different varieties of integrated participants, their relative advantages, and the newly integrated competencies. Such integrated offerings lead to the relative decline of 'traditional' specialized, market-based contracting, and to the proliferation of new alternatives, motivated by the microstructure of the participants' capabilities, and their strategic interests. A new eco-system then forms, which provides a new set of organizational and institutional alternatives.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taking the entire value chain and the participants within it over time, as the focus of our analysis, we have explored both the inertial forces sustaining and institutionalizing vertical specialization, and the forces leading to a shift from specialization to re-integration. Our analysis is consistent with Jacobides and Winter (2005) , and considers the co-evolution of transactional issues and capabilities. It also extends their recent work, by examining how exactly the vertical division of labour shapes the capability development process, which may ultimately prove to be ineffective for the industry as a whole; by focusing on the specifics of reintegration, and by fleshing out the role of agency in changing the industry's vertical structure.
Our framework confirms the nature of managers and entrepreneurs in firms as agents that try to improve, expanding on their existing trajectories or, if these are no longer tenable or profitable, potentially look to change the institutional environment. A similar point was made by Penrose (1959) in her seminal book:
The emphasis is on the internal resources of a firm-on the productive services available to a firm from its own resources […] the environment is treated in the first instance as an 'image' in the entrepreneur's mind of the possibilities and restrictions with which he is confronted, for it is, after all, such an 'image' which in fact determines a man's behaviour; whether experience confirms expectations is another story […] . Even 'demand' as seen by a firm is largely conditioned by the productive services available to it, and hence the 'direction of expansion' -the products a firms becomes interested in producing-can be analysed with reference to the relationship between its resources and its own view of its competitive position. (1959/1995:5, emphasis added) Furthermore, the entrepreneurial activities of the firms, such as contractors, engineering design consultancies and quantity surveyor, in our setting, are not only a function of what these firms are capable of doing; they are also a function of what they can 'afford' to do. And in that, the solution that each firm advances, is motivated by its incentives, as Fligstein (1991) notes:
The internal organization, the organizational field, and the state provide conditions that constrain actor's behaviors and at the same time provide opportunities for innovative behavior. In order for these conditions to operate, a model of actors in organizations is necessary because they must interpret their environment, both internal and external to the organization, and have the power to sustain or alter their organization. Actors create a view of the world in order to simplify it. Most often, that view will be framed in terms of their interests; hence, their interpretation of any new situation will be framed in those terms. Those interests will generally reflect their position in a social structure as well as their ability to articulate a coherent view of the world based on that position. […] This gives rise to the important of two issues: cognition or perception, and the role of power in organizational change. In order to make a decision to change an organization, individuals must perceive a need and source for that change. Quite often, the state or the organizational field will create shocks that reflect either a reconstitution of the rule of models of new organizational strategies that undermine the rules. […] In order for organizational change to occur, those in charge must have both a perception of some new strategy and the power to act upon it. (p. 315-316) We agree with Fligstein, and have applied his insights to the analysis of vertical scope in an industry, something that has not been done to date. We would, however, qualify it, as, in our setting at least, actors, often without a position of power, try to advance solutions that fit their short-term interests or competencies; that is, the industry's 'vertical architecture' is not governed by such 'top-down' processes as those implied by Fligstein.
That being said, the industry-level politics and strategizing that shape an industry's structure clearly require greater attention. Our analysis shows that vertical scope is a 'contested terrain', whose eventual layout undoubtedly creates 'winners' and 'losers' in much the same way as bodies of knowledge and practice are 'contested terrain' for professionals (Abbott 1988) . Despite this, however, vertical scope has been approached largely through the functionalist lens of TCE, which mainly considers how firms chose from a given menu of choices, rather than how the attractiveness of the menu evolved. Our study, in contrast, considers 'strategizing' with regard to shaping the institutional environment. Following Jacobides and Winter (2005) , we argue that firms do not "take their transactional environment as given"; instead, they operate on it and change it, and the way in which they strategically affect it (to match their advantage) becomes a critical, understudied issue.
Our analysis also qualifies the argument put forward by Christensen, Verlinden and Waterman (2003) , that integration is not always superior: its potential superiority over specialization depends on the balance between capabilities (and the evolution of the knowledge base under vertical specialization vs what would emerge under integration), and the demands placed by the market. It is quite likely that specialization, will for some time be superior to integration. It all depends on the trajectories of capability development, and their appropriateness. We also do not find support for Fine's (1998) hypothesis that re-integration happens as large, established firms or firms with proprietary solutions impose more integrated solutions; our setting did not confirm Fine's conjectures, which seem more appropriate for high-technology sectors with oligopolistic structures driven by intellectual property. On the other hand, our findings are broadly consistent with Nooteboom's (2001) "cycle of discovery" hypothesis, which suggests that re-integration may be needed to ensure effectiveness and integrality in design.
Our focus on the entire value chain, as opposed to the micro-analytics of choosing the vertical scope for a particular organization, has uncovered a dynamic framework which can account for why we observe self-reinforcing dis-integration, and when, and why re-integration comes about-not to help safeguard the industry from exogenous, novel contractual risks which require greater use of hierarchical governance, but rather because of the need for superior capabilities; and because individual firms try increase their strength, especially when challenged, and find re-integration provides the leverage needed. Finally, while transactional issues might have played a role, they were not a determining factor; rather they could be best described as an incidental feature of industry evolution, which can also be affected by firms' agency.
Limitations, Contribution, and Future Research
This paper has some limitations. First, it provides a very broad overview of the sector. We hope that this analysis will be complemented by narrower, but deeper qualitative, and possibly quantitative work that will help to further illuminate the link between competencies and agency in specific parts of the industry. Second, while we do point to some important connections between professions and stasis/change in the vertical organization in the industry, much more could be learnt by studying the way in which professions are defined by, and in turn shape the institutional structure of production (Coase 1992) . The link between the system of professions (Abbott 1988 ) and the nature of industries offers much promise for future research. Third, while we allude to the importance of knowledge bases, identity and capability development, we do not present such fine-grained data as would be needed to achieve a better handle on issues of identity and knowledge base (Albert and Whetten 1985) ; clearly, more research on how changes in scope affect identity would be desirable. Fourth, while we have alluded to the related role of frames and knowledge bases, we have not articulated how scope shapes frames, and how frames and cognitive representations feed back into scope (see Acha 2004) . Fifth, we do not directly explore the hierarchical nature of relationships in this sector, which is another factor involved in the determination of firm and industry boundaries. Questions of status, power and dependence, which have been relatively ignored by economists, have a substantial bearing on the vertical structure of industries and the nature and functioning of the markets within them; so we need to draw further on the literature on professions and the social analysis of industries (e.g. Granovetter and McGuire 1998) in order to understand the boundaries of both markets and organizations in future research. Sixth, we do not focus on the exact nature of the link between firm agency and lobbying and regulation/policy making. While our analysis does suggest that agents try to change the institutional structure of the industry to their advantage, more research is needed in order to understand when and how this happens, and what other factors mediate in this process. Borrowing the tools of political science or political economy (cf. Olson 2000; Olson and Kahkonen 2000) would appear promising.
Nevertheless, we believe that this paper makes an important contribution to the literature. By shifting the level of analysis away from the individual transaction (Williamson 1985) or the broader social system and institutional field (Fligstein 2001) , and looking at the meso-level of the evolution of the value chain and the types of players within it, we can identify the drivers both of stasis (in terms of dis-integration) and of change (the shift from dis-integration to reintegration). Our analysis, drawing on Jacobides and Winter (2005) , represents one of the first efforts to show how an industry's 'vertical architecture', the nature and structure of its vertical segments, affects knowledge bases, capabilities, and the trajectories that dynamically shape a sector's system-wide efficiencies. The resulting framework constitutes one of the few systematic efforts to explore de novo vertical re-integration, and the creation of 'one-stop-shop' solutions, a phenomenon that is on the increase (Davies 2003 (Davies , 2004 . It thus illuminates an interesting and understudied aspect of industry transformation. Increasing separation of design from cost, construction and project management expertise
Artificial institutional de-composition of an increasingly tightly coupled system
Inter-disciplinary requirements such as "buildability" and total cost containment or in-time delivery not met, as no-one can provide these competences
No actor has full control over a building, (a) because of the contractual breaks among interdependent activities; and (b) separate trajectories of competencies development Positioned as a complement to use of integrated construction providers
Trends favouring Re-integration
Construction industry clients with limited expertise in building procurement, or those wishing to focus away from having in house building procurement expertise favour reintegrated solutions Customers focusing on "buildability", responsiveness, and total cost, or other systemic properties (integration of services and buildings) attracted to re-integration.
Emphasis on "business solution" as opposed to "procedural accountability" makes the nature of re-integrated services more plausible Increasing view of buildings as part of a "system" makes re-integration (through "thin transactional coordination", or truly integrated provision) more attractive De-institutionalization of professions makes previous limitations dis-appear, facilitating institutional innovation and changes in the vertical organization of the sector Government-commissioned reports / task forces on the sector (Egan, Latham) recognize systemic limitations and problems with capability structures, and help provide the institutional background for new, re-integrated solutions.
